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Direct Grading & Paving LLC v. Dist. Ct. (Century Cmtys. of Nev., LLC), 137 Nev. Adv. Op.
31 (Jul. 8, 2021)1
Authority to Intervene in an Arbitration
SUMMARY:
NRS 38.222 provides limited authority to intervene in an arbitration, specifically, only
where the district court orders a provisional remedy.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Direct Grading & Paving, LLC (Direct) and Century Communities of Nevada, LLC
(Century) entered into a Master Subcontract Agreement (MSA) and Project Work Authorizations
for four construction projects to be performed on Century’s properties. The MSA included an
arbitration clause that stated that “any disputed claim . . . shall [be] settled by arbitration” unless
both parties agree otherwise. During construction, a dispute arose: Century fired Direct, claiming
Direct failed to timely perform the work, and, in response, Direct recorded four mechanic’s liens
on the properties it worked on. The parties agreed to settle the dispute by arbitration and agreed to
Direct filing a complaint in district court to (i) stay the action, (ii) select an arbitrator, and (iii)
allow the case to proceed through arbitration.
In the discovery phase of the arbitration, Century hired an expert accountant to examine
documents. The accountant uncovered alleged alterations in Direct’s documents that covered up
an approximate $550,000 overcharge for dirt delivery to one of Century’s properties. Further,
Century also learned that it had a potential conflict of interest with Direct because Century’s former
land development manager worked for a company owned by Direct. This former land development
manager had the authority to approve Direct’s invoices on Century’s behalf.
Direct claimed it was unaware of the alleged alterations and asserted that the only reason
its employee altered the documents was because she thought she was missing another document.
Direct also asserted that any errors in the documents did not matter because Century ultimately
received the materials needed for the project and was not actually overcharged. Lastly, Direct
argued a conflict of interest did not exist because Century’s upper management had to approve any
Project Work Authorizations the land development manager processed.
After these discoveries, the arbitrator stopped all other discovery and ordered an
independent third-party IT specialist to sweep Direct’s computers, cell phones, and server. The IT
specialist performed the sweep but alleged that Direct intentionally used software upgrades to
complicate the sweep and purposely concealed computer data by withholding the computer or hard
drive used by the employee who allegedly altered the records. Following this report, Century
motioned for sanctions against Direct, asking the arbitrator to strike Direct’s claims, enter adverse
claims against Direct, remove Direct’s mechanic liens, dismiss any claims Direct had against
Century’s surety bonds, and award Century its fees and costs. The arbitrator refused to strike
Direct’s claims, electing, rather, to reserve the right to later supplement the order or make a further
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ruling on Direct’s potential failure to preserve evidence. However, despite not striking Direct’s
claims, the arbitrator ordered Direct to pay Century $130,000.
Century moved for clarification and reconsideration of the arbitrator’s order, asking the
arbitrator to make an express ruling on Century’s motion to expunge Direct’s liens and release the
bonds. Century also asserted that the conflict of interest was a breach of the parties’ agreement and
should prevent Direct from receiving any pay. Lastly, Century requested an evidentiary hearing to
obtain more evidence, an issue of an interim award, and additional sanctions because Direct had
still not yet paid Century the $130,000 from the previous sanctions.
In response, the arbitrator stated the prior ruling was clear and unambiguous that no liens
were to be expunged yet. Additionally, the arbitrator ordered that the $130,000 would be deducted
from one of Direct’s mechanic’s liens if Direct did not pay Century in 30 days. Lastly, the arbitrator
denied Century’s demands for an evidentiary hearing and ordered the parties to prepare a joint
recommendation for proposed additional discovery.
Unsatisfied, Century filed a motion in district court for provisional relief pursuant to NRS
38.222, requesting the district court to remedy Direct’s misconduct and rule on their motion. The
district court found it (i) had authority to intervene under NRS 38.222 because it would be
providing provisional relief and (ii) had inherent authority under NRCP 37 to address alleged
discovery misconduct and alteration of documents because Direct earlier filed a complaint that
was stayed and removed to arbitration. Direct filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion
was denied. Direct then filed the instant petition for writ relief.
DISCUSSION:
We exercise our discretion to entertain the writ petition
Direct’s writ petition posed an important issue of first impression: whether NRS
38.222 authorizes district courts to intervene in binding arbitration to remedy alleged
misconduct. Thus, the court elected to consider Direct’s writ petition, reasoning that
clarifying this issue would serve judicial economy by ensuring the matter proceeded in the
correct forum.
The district court erred by hearing a discovery dispute from parties involved in arbitration
The district court erred by hearing the discovery dispute between Century and Direct
because a provisional remedy can only be provided if the “matter is urgent and the arbitrator is not
able to act timely or . . . provide an adequate remedy.”2 A proper example of a provisional remedy
would be “a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, a prejudgment receivership, or
an attachment,” that “is intended to maintain the status quo by protecting a person’s safety or
preserving property.” 3 NRS 38.222 does not allow district courts to withdraw cases from
arbitration or award potentially case-ending sanctions that the arbitrator previously declined to
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award.4 Rather, it only allows a district court to provide a temporary remedy to preserve the status
quo if the arbitrator is unable to do so.
NRS 38.222
Here, nothing about Century’s motion for provisional relief filed in the district court
suggested NRS 38.222 applies to allow district court intervention. Century failed to show the
arbitrator lacked enough time or was unable, as opposed to unwilling, to remedy any demonstrated
misconduct. Additionally, Century failed to show the matter was urgent and failed to request a
proper provisional remedy. Instead, Century requested sanctions for misconduct, an evidentiary
hearing, and expungement of Direct’s liens. If the district court were to grant Century’s motion, it
will have effectively resolved the entire case in Century’s favor rather than preserve the status quo.
Thus, the district court erred in hearing the discovery dispute as NRS 38.222 does not allow such
interference in arbitration.
Inherent powers
Additionally, the district court erred in concluding it had inherent authority under NRCP
37. The district court’s reasoning was flawed because it detrimentally relied on several cases that
only concerned a court’s authority over its own pending cases and not cases that have been stayed
and removed to arbitration. 5 Thus, the district court’s conclusion that Direct’s initially filed
complaint gave it inherent authority was erroneous because Direct’s complaint was merely filed
to preserve the statute of limitations and was then removed to arbitration. The district court does
not have any inherent authority over the arbitration case.
CONCLUSION:
Thus, the district court did not have authority to intervene in arbitration to sanction party
misconduct where parties did not seek, and the district court did not provide, a provisional remedy.
Further, district court did not have any inherent authority to intervene because neither Nevada law,
nor Direct’s lawsuit filed in the district court, gave it authority under the facts of this case.
Accordingly, Direct’s petition for writ relief is granted and the district court’s order granting
Century’s motion for provisional relief is vacated. The case is returned to arbitration.
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